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ABSTRACT. This article uses data from Northern Tanzania to analyse how 
economic empowerment helps women reduce their reproductive health vulnerability. 
It analyses the effect of women’s employment and economic contribution to their 
household on health care use at three phases in the reproductive cycle: before 
pregnancy, during pregnancy and at child birth. Economic empowerment shows a 
positive effect at health seeking behaviour during pregnancy and at child birth, which 
remains robust after controlling for bargaining power and selection bias. This 
indicates that any policy that increases women’s economic empowerment can have a 
direct positive impact on women’s reproductive health. 
I. Introduction 
In most developing countries, women do not have complete control over their physical well-
being, including their health, bodily integrity and security. This becomes clear when 
pregnancy-related decisions are made. When and how many children to have, and whether 
and where to seek pre-natal and delivery care, are crucial decisions that directly influence the 
health and survival prospects of women and their (unborn) child. However, as these decisions 
are made within the context of a household or family, they might be outside the control of 
women themselves (for example S. Becker, 1996; Urassa, Massawe, Lindmark, & Nyström, 
1997).  
Millennium Development Goal 5, according to which maternal mortality rates are to be 
reduced by 75 per cent between 1990 and 2015 and universal access to reproductive health is 
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achieved, is one of the goals on which least progress has been made, especially in East Africa 
(Simwaka, Theobald, Amekudzi, & Tolhurst, 2005). At the UN Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD) in 1994, the role of women’s economic empowerment to promote 
reproductive health and rights was emphasized, and although the general effect of 
empowerment on women’s reproductive health is unlikely to be questioned, the size of this 
effect as well as the mechanisms through which it works, are less clear. For policy 
effectiveness this is of high importance. In this paper we focus on the potential effect of 
women’s economic empowerment on reproductive health service use, as a way to reduce the 
risk of unintended pregnancy and complications during pregnancy and child birth, hence 
reducing reproductive health vulnerability.  
The potential effects of women’s economic empowerment depend on how households are 
actually organized. Different household models exist, leading to competing hypotheses. 
Whether household members act as autonomous agents, bargaining processes are taking place 
among household members who (partially) pool income, or households pool all resources and 
act upon a common set of preferences, matters for the hypothesised effect of women’s 
economic empowerment on reproductive health service use (for a review of these models, see 
for example Agarwal, 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997; Lundberg & Pollak, 
1996). 
In this study, we test competing hypotheses by analysing the effect of women’s 
employment and contribution to their household’s income on their use of reproductive health 
care services in Tanzania. For this, we re-interviewed a subsample of women from the 
Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) 2004, resulting in a two wave data set.1 
With these data, we study the impact of women’s economic empowerment, as measured in 
2004, on women’s reproductive health care use between 2004 and 2010. We focus on three 
important phases in the reproductive cycle: 1) before pregnancy, 2) during pregnancy, and 3) 
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at childbirth. Decisions made at each of these three phases can have far-reaching 
consequences for women’s well-being and their families, as non-use of reproductive health 
care services can substantially increase women’s vulnerability to reproductive health risks. 
First, before pregnancy, family planning can reduce important risks for maternal 
morbidity and mortality by controlling the number and spacing of children (Cleland et al., 
2006). Second, during pregnancy, antenatal care helps women identify danger signs and 
symptoms of health problems, and it also provides important medical care, such as tetanus 
toxoid immunization and the provision of iron tablets, folate supplements and malaria pills 
(WHO, 2003). Third, at childbirth, a major risk for maternal health is caused by home 
delivery. In East Africa home deliveries are rarely attended by a trained professional, so that 
complications are often belatedly recognized. This combined with long travel times and the 
lack of adequate transport means, makes it often impossible to receive timely emergency 
obstetric care at a hospital (Urassa et al., 1997).  
According to our results, women who are economically active and women who contribute 
to their household’s income visit a health centre for antenatal care check-ups more frequently. 
Women who contribute to their household’s income are also less likely to deliver at home. 
The results remain robust with additional control variables, including controls for bargaining 
power and different types of selection bias. This provides evidence in support of policies that 
help women obtain access to income-earning activities, as this will benefit them in terms of a 
lower exposure to reproductive health risks. 
II. Conceptual section 
In this section, we firstly describe existing literature on the relationship between women’s 
economic empowerment and reproductive health. Next, we discuss some of the most 
commonly used household models in the literature, a
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2.1 Related literature 
Several scholars have studied the influence of women’s economic position on reproductive 
health by focusing on their asset ownership, their contribution to household income or their 
employment. A study from Indonesia found a positive relationship between female asset 
ownership and the use of prenatal and delivery care (Beegle, Frankenberg, & Thomas, 2001). 
Schuler and colleagues (1997) combined both female asset ownership and the contribution to 
household income into one indicator and found it is positively related to contraceptive use in 
Bangladesh. A study in Zimbabwe (Hindin, 2000) discovered that employment has a positive 
effect on five out of six family planning indicators, including the number of children and 
contraceptive use. Contrary to these three studies, Furuta and Salway (2006) found in Nepal 
that employed women who have control over their own earnings do not have a higher 
likelihood of receiving antenatal care or to have a skilled birth attendant present during the 
delivery. 
From these studies we can conclude that, where a statistically significant effect is found, 
it supports the hypothesis that economic engagement is positively related to reproductive 
health. It is tempting to conclude on the basis of this evidence that if women are 
economically active they are less likely to be exposed to reproductive health risks. However, 
the results of these studies might suffer from endogeneity bias due to the use of cross-
sectional data.2 Importantly, it is also unclear what conceptual models were used in these 
studies. In our study, we attempt to tackle these shortcomings, by solving potential 
endogeneity biases and relying on an identification strategy that allows us to test competing 
hypotheses generated by different household models. This is important for policymaking as it 
provides insights on the mechanisms through which economic empowerment may lower 
women’s reproductive health vulnerability. 
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2.2 Conceptual models and hypotheses 
Most decisions that have an impact on women’s reproductive health are made within the 
context of a household. However, there is no consensus in the literature about how such 
households are best conceptualized and different competing models exist. For a long time it 
was assumed that households pooled all resources and acted upon a common set of 
preferences (see e.g. the altruist model (G. S. Becker, 1974)). Recent empirical evidence, 
however, has rejected both assumptions of these ‘common preference models’ by showing 
that the control women have on household income clearly determines the pattern of 
household expenditures. For example, a higher control by women tends to lead to better child 
health, nutrition and child survival probabilities (Haddad & Hoddinott, 1994; Thomas, 1990). 
In response to the growing dissatisfaction with common preference models, cooperative 
bargaining models have been elaborated that recognize the possibility that men and women in 
the same household have different preferences. In these models household members bargain 
over the allocation of economic resources determining their individual utility, and in case of 
disagreement they obtain a pay-off at a ‘threat point’. The latter determines their bargaining 
power, as a higher utility obtained at the threat point allows one to enforce a bargaining 
solution that generates higher individual utility. There are two types of bargaining models, 
which differ on the threat points used. In so called ‘divorce-threat models’ (e.g. McElroy & 
Horney, 1981) the threat point exists outside marriage, represented by the utility obtained 
after divorcing. In the ‘separate spheres’ model of Lundberg and Pollak (1996) the threat 
point is a non-cooperative equilibrium within the marriage. With such marital non-
cooperation each spouse contributes to public goods consumed by the entire household taking 
into account what the other spouse does, so that public goods are typically undersupplied 
(Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986). 
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How we conceptualize households has important implications for the hypothesized 
influence of women’s economic empowerment on reproductive health outcomes (see Figure 
1 for a diagram with our hypotheses). With ‘common preference models’, it should not matter 
who controls the resources and we would expect that women’s economic empowerment does 
not influence reproductive health outcomes (hypothesis 1).3 If preferences differ, however, 
women’s economic empowerment should matter for reproductive health outcomes, leading to 
two additional alternative hypotheses that differ on whether men and women actually bargain 
about the allocation of economic resources. 
The two bargaining models discussed above suggest that women obtain higher utility 
within their household if they have higher bargaining power. Their bargaining power in turn 
may depend on the share of income they contribute to the household. This brings us to 
hypothesis 2 according to which women’s economic empowerment increases reproductive 
health through its positive influence on women’s bargaining power. This is true in the 
‘divorce threat model’ if we assume that women keep the same income sources after divorce 
or in the ‘separate spheres’ model if both spouses come to an agreement.4 
However, if both spouses disagree (and decide not to divorce) we are at the non-
cooperative equilibrium in the separate spheres model and bargaining should not matter 
anymore. Of course, men and women can still independently decide how much to allocate to 
public (and private) goods, and given women’s stronger preference to spend recourses on 
(reproductive) health we expect women’s economic empowerment to exert a direct influence 
on reproductive health (hypothesis 3). 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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Which hypothesis is confirmed has important consequences for policy makers. If the results 
are in line with hypotheses 2 or 3, strengthening women’s economic position could be an 
intervention strategy to improve reproductive health care uptake. However, finding evidence 
for an indirect effect through increased bargaining power (hypothesis 2) complicates the 
intervention design, compared to the design needed if a direct effect is found (hypothesis 3).5 
To test these hypotheses we estimate the effect of economic empowerment on reproductive 
health decisions with and without controls for women’s bargaining power. If no effect is 
observed in both models, hypothesis 1 is confirmed. If we find a positive effect in the model 
without controlling for bargaining power, which disappears after controlling for bargaining 
power, hypothesis 2 is confirmed. If the effect of economic empowerment is found without 
controlling for bargaining power and remains robust after controlling for it, hypothesis 3 is 
confirmed.  
III. Data and methods 
In this section, we start with a short description of the study area. Thereafter, we describe the 
data collection and present the dependent variables, explanatory variables and control 
variables. 
3.1 Study area 
To investigate the influence of economic empowerment on women’s reproductive health 
vulnerability, we selected the Lake Zone region (consisting of three regions bordering Lake 
Victoria: Kagera, Mwanza, and Mara) in Northern Tanzania as study site, a rural dominated 
area. Among the key assets of rural families in Tanzania are land, livestock and labour. In 
most areas, women are usually excluded from ownership or inheritance rights over land, yet, 
they work on average more hours on the land compared to men, representing distinct gender 
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roles (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Holmboe-Ottesen & Wandel, 1991). In 2004, 86 per cent of the 
women in the region were employed, most of them in agriculture (NBS, 2005), however most 
work is unpaid. The economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s have forced women to increase 
their economic participation, though, lack of spousal support and competing domestic 
responsibilities still limit the economic possibilities of women (Bryceson, 1995; IFC/WB, 
2007; Koda, 1995). The increased economic engagement by women has resulted in an 
additional burden, but sometimes also in greater autonomy within their households. In a 
recent study, Vyas and colleagues (2014) characterized some Tanzanian households as 
cooperative, where income is pooled, yet others as non-cooperative. In the cooperative 
household models, women’s income had a positive effect on bargaining power, as husbands 
appeared to be appreciative of the increased contribution to the household. According to 
others (Holmboe-Ottesen & Wandel, 1991; Ellis & Mdoe, 2003) men usually have authority 
in decision-making concerning food production and sale of food crops. Yet, as men are 
dependent on women’s willingness to contribute their labour to the farm business, women are 
able to influence these decisions, hence bargaining processes seem to take place.  
We selected the Lake Zone Region for this research, because contraceptive use is among 
the lowest in the country, and fertility rates and the proportion of home deliveries among the 
highest, resulting in high reproductive health vulnerability. Child mortality has rapidly 
declined since 1999, and Tanzania has a high coverage of antenatal care, but maternal 
mortality is amongst the highest in the world, as home deliveries are still common practice. 
To increase the proportion of births delivered at health centres, the Tanzanian government 
has set up an exemption scheme to reduce access barriers to quality care. However, this 
exemption scheme is not always consistently applied, especially the costs for caesarean-
sections remain high (Quijada & Comfort, 2002). Emergency obstetric complications such as 
eclampsia and ante partum haemorrhage are important risk factors for maternal death, yet 
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these conditions can only be treated in hospitals, which are often difficult to reach by the 
rural poor (MoH, 2008). Fertility rates remain high with significant differences across regions 
and particularly high rates in the Lake Zone: 7.3 in Kagera, 6.3 in Mwanza and 7.0 in Mara 
(NBS, 2005). Couples do not always agree on the ideal family size, with husbands tending to 
prefer more children than women (Bankole & Singh, 1998). Hence, the question is who 
decides or whose preference has a greater impact. According to Mosha and colleagues (2013) 
men generally show a lack of interest to be involved in family planning issues, reflected by a 
lack of communication between spouses on the topic, yet they are considered the most 
important decision-makers. Similarly, a study by Pembe et al (2008) shows that husbands and 
relatives (especially the mother-in-law) are the main decision-makers in maternal referrals. 
To the contrary, Danforth and colleagues (2009) describe that when spouses disagree on the 
location of delivery, the woman’s opinion is more influential in the final decision.  
 
3.2 Data collection 
To analyse the impact of economic empowerment on women’s reproductive health 
vulnerability we re-interviewed women of the Tanzanian Demographic Health Survey 
(TDHS) in the Lake Zone region. In 2004, 1,226 women (aged 15-49) from 1,126 households 
were interviewed in this region. In the summer of 2010, we were able to re-interview 807 
women (from 765 households), 65.8 per cent of the original sample. The survey in 2004 and 
2010 collected information on topics such as education, employment, asset ownership, 
marriage, fertility, contraceptive use, antenatal and delivery care.  
3.3 Dependent variables: contraceptive use, antenatal care and place of delivery 
In all models, we analyse the influence of women’s employment and contribution to their 
household’s income as measured in 2004 on the use of reproductive health services as 
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measured between 2004 and 2010 (or at the time of the interview in 2010 in case of 
contraceptive use). Hence, as empowerment levels are measured before reproductive health 
outcomes, we limit endogeneity issues due to inverse causality. 
We estimate three different regression models, each corresponding to one phase in the 
reproductive cycle. First, we analyse the influence of employment and contributing to the 
household’s income on the use of contraceptive methods. As dependent variable we use a 
binary variable equal to one if women were using a (modern or traditional) contraceptive 
method at the moment of the interview in 2010. Second, we study the influence of economic 
empowerment on the use of antenatal care, measured by the number of antenatal care visits 
during the last pregnancy (between 2004 and 2010). Third, we are interested in the impact of 
empowerment on the place of delivery. Home deliveries are rarely attended by a health 
professional. Health staff at dispensaries and health centres are able to assist a normal 
delivery, but emergency obstetric care is only provided at hospitals. Accordingly, we 
distinguish three categories for place of delivery: at home or on the way, at a local health 
facility (dispensary or health centre) and at a hospital.  
3.4 Explanatory variables: economic empowerment and bargaining power 
In all models, we use the same set of explanatory variables. We use two measurements of 
economic empowerment.6 First, we distinguish three categories of employment: not working, 
working at home, and working away from home. Women who work away from home are 
more likely to have greater mobility, improving their accessibility to health facilities. 
Alternatively, working women might be hampered in accessing health facilities due to a time 
constraint. Second, we measure women’s income contribution using the question: ‘On 
average, how much of your household’s expenditures do your earnings pay for?’ Answer 
categories range from (almost) none to (almost) all. Due to low number of observations in the 
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middle categories, we recoded this variable into a dummy: women who do not contribute to 
the household income score a zero; contributing some to (almost) all is represented by a one.7 
Women who are not working, or are not paid are coded a zero. 
As explained before, bargaining power might be an important intermediary variable. It is 
closely related to women’s agency in the household. Hence, to proxy bargaining power, we 
use indicators that measure women’s involvement in intra-household decision-making (NBS, 
2005). We create the variables ‘domestic decision-making’ and ‘control over money’. For the 
first variable, we asked who in the family has the final say on decisions in four daily 
situations (small household purchases, large household purchases, visits to family or 
relatives, and the food to be cooked each day). Answer categories are recoded into dummy 
variables reporting a zero if the respondent was not involved and a one if the respondent 
made the decision solely or jointly with her husband or someone else.8 Next, we calculate a 
factor score (using maximum likelihood factor analysis, selecting the first factor) based on 
the four reported answers.9 The survey included a fifth item: decisions regarding your own 
health care. As including this item would tend to result in a tautology, and as the item did not 
link as well with the other items (strongly reducing the Cronbach’s alpha), we decided to 
eliminate this item. For the second variable, the question was posed ‘Do you yourself control 
the money needed to buy the following (food, clothes, medicines, and toiletries)?’ For this 
variable answer categories are limited to yes or no. A factor score is calculated to combine 
the four items.10  
3.5 Control variables  
To avoid omitted variable bias, we include control variables at the individual, household, and 
community level that we expect to correlate with women’s economic empowerment and to 
exert an independent effect on the dependent variables. According to the literature, the 
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following variables possibly correlate with both women’s economic empowerment and 
reproductive health: age, number of previous births and previous pregnancy loss (Bryceson, 
1995), education and education of husband (see Abadian, 1996; Lindelow, 2008; Odutolu, 
Adedimeji, Odutolu, & Baruwa, 2003), religion (Kabeer, 1999), media exposure (Rogers et 
al., 1999), presence of the husband and nature of the marriage (Wong & Levine, 1992), 
wealth (WB, 2012), region, and remoteness of the community (Holvoet, 2005).11 
IV. Results 
We firstly present descriptive statistics of the most important variables used in our analyses. 
Thereafter, we present the estimated effects of women’s economic empowerment at three 
different phases in the reproductive cycle. For each analysis, we estimate three models. 
Model 1 only includes women’s employment. In Model 2, we add women’s income 
contribution as explanatory variable, after which we add the two indicators of bargaining 
power in Model 3 and in Model 4 we add the control variables. Finally, we correct for 
possible selection bias by estimating Heckman models and applying inverse probability 
weighting. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. We observe that in 2010, just 
over 20 per cent of the women in our sample were using a contraceptive method, either 
modern (approximately 17 per cent) or traditional (approximately 4 per cent). As to antenatal 
care, about 90 per cent of the Tanzanian women in our sample received antenatal check-ups. 
The average number of visits per pregnancy was 3.5, with 49 per cent of the women receiving 
at least four check-ups, as recommended by the WHO, which is significantly lower than the 
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national percentage of 62 (WHO, 2011). We also observe that of the women in our sample 
who had at least one pregnancy between 2004 and 2010, slightly over 50 per cent delivered at 
home. Around 30 per cent delivered at a dispensary or health centre, and the remaining 20 per 
cent gave birth at a hospital. Over 50 per cent of the women who gave birth at home stated 
that it was not their intention to deliver there. For the women who gave birth at a hospital or a 
local health facility these figures are roughly 12 and 7 per cent, respectively. This is in line 
with the assumption that women have a preference for using reproductive health services, but 
apparently experience certain constraints in acting upon this preference. These constraints 
could be financial or geographical barriers or could point to the intra-household decision-
making process. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Almost all women in the sample are economically active (97.46 per cent, mostly in 
agriculture, weighted sample). However, only approximately 15 per cent of the women 
contribute to the household income (which is similar to the national average), as most 
perform unpaid work. Roughly 44 per cent of the sample works at home, and 53 per cent 
away from home. Yet, women who contribute to the household income are more likely to 
work away from home, compared to the women who do not contribute.12 Although the full 
sample is married or cohabitating, not all spouses live in the same household. Among the 
women who contribute financially to the household, slightly more husbands are living 
elsewhere: 13.9 versus 10.9 per cent. However, the proportion of female headed households 
is the same among both groups (both slightly under ten per cent). The women in the 15 per 
cent category are on average slightly wealthier (significant at 5 per cent level) compared to 
other women.  
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As hypothesis 2 assumes a relation between economic empowerment and bargaining 
power it is useful to have a closer look at the association between these two domains of 
empowerment. Almost all women who make a (substantial) contribution state that they have 
control (either joint or alone) over their own income. However, this does not necessarily lead 
to control over household expenses (for food, clothes, medicines, and toiletries), shown by 
the lack of a significant correlation.13 Women who are not working or working at or close to 
home do have more control over expenses, compared to women who are working away from 
home. In contrast, women who contribute to the household income score significantly higher 
on the intra-household decision-making index, as expected. Yet, employment does not show 
any correlation to intra-household decision-making. All variables are measured in 2004, 
hence no causal chain can be determined.  
In sum, women who contribute to the household income usually have some control over 
their own income, but it does not automatically lead to control over household expenditure. 
Employment even relates to a reduced control over money expenses. The economic 
contribution made by women is associated with increased bargaining power as measured by 
the intra-household decision-making index.14 
4.2 The influence of women’s income contribution on reproductive health 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression models on the likelihood of contraceptive use. In 
addition to the variables presented above, we control for women’s need of a family planning 
method (in 2010), by adding variables that indicate whether women were (still) fecund and 
whether they were pregnant or amenorrheic. Employment does not relate to contraceptive 
use, as shown by model 1. The results of model 2 show that women who contribute to their 
household income are 13 per cent more likely to use contraceptive methods, compared to 
women who contribute nothing, rejecting hypothesis 1. This direct effect remains present – 
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and becomes even stronger – after controlling for bargaining power (model 3), which rejects 
hypothesis 2 and supports hypothesis 3. Unexpectedly, we find that intra-household decision-
making has a negative influence. The effect is rather small though. The coefficient for the 
standardized score is -0.031, indicating that an increase of one standard deviation on the 
index score results in a 3.1 per cent lower chance of using contraceptive methods. Finally, we 
observe that after adding control variables (model 4) the effect of economic empowerment 
disappears. Control over household expenditure becomes significant in model 4. It shows the 
expected positive effect.  
In sum, based on model 4, employment and contributing to the household income does 
not exert a direct effect on contraceptive use. The effect of bargaining power is mixed: 
control over household expensed does increase the chance of using contraceptive methods, 
but intra-household decision making shows the opposite effect. For the estimated coefficients 
of the control variables see Table A1 in the online Appendix.  
Here, we have taken the use of traditional and modern contraceptive methods together. 
Yet, it could be argued that there is an important difference between the two types of 
methods. Traditional methods (e.g. periodical abstinence, withdrawal) are less reliable and 
more importantly, access is not restrained by financial limitations, nor physical distance to a 
facility. On the other hand, traditional methods usually require cooperation from both 
spouses, while several modern contraceptives can be used covertly. When running the 
analysis with modern contraceptive use as dependent variable, the results remain the same. 
Running the analyses with traditional contraceptive methods as dependent variable results in 
minor differences: women working at or close to home are slightly less likely to use 
traditional methods compared to women who are not economically active, or those who are 
working away from home. Control over money has a small positive effect (tables available 
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upon request). However, caution should be made in making firm conclusions based on these 
results, as only four per cent of the women uses traditional contraceptives.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 reports the estimated influence of female empowerment on the number of ANC visits 
during the last pregnancy.15 Similar to the analyses on contraceptive use, we find that 
women’s contribution to the household’s income has a positive effect on the use of antenatal 
care. Model 2 shows that women who pay for (some of) the household’s expenses receive on 
average 0.789 more pregnancy check-ups, compared to women who do not contribute at all.16 
The direct effect of economic empowerment remains intact after adding the bargaining power 
indicators in model 3, which is in line with hypothesis 3. The effect is also robust to adding 
control variables (model 4). Employment does show a positive effect as well. Women who 
work at or close to home are more likely to receive antenatal care, compared to women who 
are not working at all. The effects remain robust throughout all models. In model 4, the 
indicator representing women who work away from home also shows a positive effect. Both 
indicators of bargaining power do not show any effect.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
We also studied the relationship between economic empowerment and the place of 
delivery, presented by Table 4.17 The first four models report the marginal probabilities of 
delivering at a health facility (hospital, dispensary or health centre) versus delivery at home. 
A comparison between hospital delivery and deliveries elsewhere (home delivery or delivery 
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at a dispensary or a health centre) is presented in the last four models. When comparing the 
models, we conclude that the effects differ slightly for the different types of delivery places.  
Employment is not related to delivering a child at a health facility. Yet, model 2 indicates 
that, on average, women who contribute to the household’s income have a 35 per cent higher 
chance to deliver at any health facility compared to women who do not contribute. As this 
effect remains robust in all models, and, in particular, is of similar size in models 3 and 4, 
hypothesis 3 is supported. Control over household expenses does show a robust positive 
effect as well, the coefficient of intra-household decision-making is not significant.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The likelihood of delivery at a hospital (versus at other health facilities or at home) is also 
influenced by women’s contribution to household income, resulting in a 22.5 per cent higher 
probability to deliver at a hospital (Model 2). Again, the direct effect remains intact after 
adding the bargaining power indicators (model 3), confirming hypothesis 3. Employment 
does not show a similar strong effect. Only in the full model, employment is significant at the 
ten per cent level: women who are working away from home are more likely to deliver at a 
hospital, compared to unemployed women. Similar to the analysis on contraceptive methods, 
domestic decision-making exerts a negative influence on delivering at a hospital. 
In sum, our results indicate that economic empowerment reduces women’s vulnerability 
at two out of three stages in the reproductive cycle. Women who contribute to their 
household’s income receive on average more antenatal care check-ups and are less likely to 
deliver at home, and women who work at or close to home are more likely to receive 
antenatal care. As the effects of the financial contribution made to the household is stronger 
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in most models (except for ANC), it can be concluded that the share of household resources 
is more important than labour itself in predicting health seeking behaviour.  
 
4.3 Correcting selection bias  
Estimates may be biased because of three potential sources of non-randomness in our sample 
that are correlated with women’s economic empowerment. First, we managed to re-interview 
slightly over 65 per cent of the original sample. If women’s economic empowerment is 
correlated with the likelihood to be selected in our sample (because more empowered women 
more likely migrated or were working elsewhere at the moment of our survey, for example) 
attrition bias might affect the estimation of the empowerment effects. Second, as 
empowerment is foremost a relational factor we limited the sample to women who were 
married in both 2004 and 2010. This selection could lead to an additional selection bias, if 
economic empowerment is correlated with divorce and/or marriage. Third, to analyse 
antenatal care and child delivery, having had a pregnancy since 2004 is a prerequisite, and 
consequently some women were not included. If the likelihood of being pregnant is 
correlated with empowerment (Bryceson, 1995), such selection may lead to an additional 
bias. 
To obtain a first idea about possible non-random selection and hence possible biases, we 
perform three tests. Whereas the economic contribution made to the household does not seem 
to be correlated with selection, employment does. Furthermore, some other variables – 
including bargaining power – differ between attritors and non-attritors, and seem to explain 
same of the variation in (non-)selection. Based on the BGLW-test we can reject the null 
hypothesis that selection is random  (Baulch & Quisumbing, 2011; Outes-Leon & Dercon, 
2008). More information about the three tests can be found in the online Appendix. 
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Insert Table 5 here 
 
To correct for possible selection bias, we apply and compare two methods: a Heckman model 
and Inverse Probability Weights. Both models use additional (exogenous) variables to 
estimate selection, yet the latter relaxes the assumption of exogeneity. For a more detailed 
description of the analyses, see the online Appendix.  
Table 5 summarizes the results for the four dependent variables. Both the Heckman model 
as well as the IPW-model, do not change the lack of effect of the financial contribution made 
to the household on contraceptive use. However, in the IPW-model, employment has a 
negative effect on contraceptive use. Regarding ANC visits, the Rho-statistic from the 
Heckman model tells us that selection bias might be present. Yet, the effect of women’s 
economic empowerment (both employment and income contribution) remains significant. In 
the IPW-model, the effect of one employment category disappeared. In explaining child 
delivery at any health facility, we find an insignificant Rho-statistic in the Heckman model, 
indicating a lack of selection bias, which is supported by the robust coefficients of economic 
empowerment in both models. In the final model – explaining delivery at a hospital – the 
effect of economic contribution to the household is not statistically significant anymore in the 
Heckman model, while working at home suddenly shows a strong negative effect. However, 
in the IPW-model, the results remain robust.  
In sum, in five out of eight models the results remain unchanged after controlling for 
selection bias. In two models, the main effects change in the Heckman models, but remain 
robust when applying IPW, in one model a small difference is found when applying IPW (for 
the full models see Tables A4 to A6 in the online Appendix). 
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V. Discussion and conclusion 
In this article, we studied the role of economic empowerment on women’s exposure to 
reproductive health risks in Northern Tanzania. We explored the effect of women’s 
employment and income contribution to their household on health care use at three important 
phases in the reproductive cycle: before pregnancy, during pregnancy and at child birth. In 
contrast to most evidence that is based on analyses of cross-sectional data, we made use of 
data from 2004 and 2010, which allows us to obtain estimates that are less prone to 
endogeneity biases. Moreover, we rely on an identification strategy that allows us to obtain 
insights into the mechanisms through which economic empowerment may lower women’s 
reproductive health vulnerability. 
We found that women who are economically active visit a health centre for antenatal care 
check-ups more frequently. Women who contribute to the household’s income have on 
average a more frequent use of antenatal care and are less likely to deliver at home. Adding 
two indicators of bargaining power to the model did not alter the direct effect of making an 
economic contribution to the household. The significant effect of economic empowerment on 
contraceptive use disappeared after adding all control variables. We made use of Heckman 
models and inverse probability weights to control for possible selection and attrition bias. In 
most models the effect remained robust. 
These results convincingly reject hypothesis 1, according to which economic 
empowerment would not have any influence on reproductive health outcomes. This 
hypothesis was inspired by common preference household models, which assume that 
households pool all resources and act upon a common set of preferences. The strong 
association between women’s contribution to the household income and their reproductive 
health vulnerability that we observed goes against these views. 
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Our results are not in line with hypothesis 2 either. In most models, the effect of economic 
empowerment remains robust (and of similar size) after controlling for bargaining power. If 
economic empowerment worked through increased bargaining power, we would see a decline 
in the size of the effect of economic empowerment when adding controls for bargaining 
power. The results on health seeking behaviour during pregnancy and at delivery support the 
idea that economic empowerment has a direct effect on health care seeking behaviour, 
confirming hypothesis 3. Women are likely to spend their own income directly on their own 
health care without bargaining, which is in line with the non-cooperative model.  
Although our results point to a non-cooperative household model, we have been unable to 
test the assumptions behind this model. We have limited information about women’s 
preferences for health seeking behaviour and even less so for their husbands. As such, we are 
unable to compare the preferences of the spouses with the final decision made. In addition, 
we measure bargaining power indirectly by two proxies. These two indicators even show 
some mixed effects, indicating that the concept – and especially the process – of bargaining 
power is difficult to grasp. Yet, a closer analysis of the pathways and interrelationships 
between various sources or indicators of empowerment falls outside the scope of this paper. 
We also acknowledge that the measurement of economic empowerment in this paper is 
limited, as it only focuses on economic engagement and the contribution to the household 
income and as it does not allow a comparison between different scales of contribution. As 
this study was conducted in a predominantly rural area, where most women perform unpaid 
work in agriculture, it would be interesting to repeat this study in a more urban area with a 
higher diversity in income sources.  
Despite some limitations, our results provide useful insights for policy makers. To lower 
women’s reproductive health vulnerability, it is not necessary to work on women’s 
bargaining position, as becoming economically more important as such can have direct 
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beneficial effects for women’s vulnerability to reproductive health risks. Any policy that 
increases women’s access to income generating activities has therefore the potential to 
effectively lower women’s reproductive health vulnerability. 
 
Notes
                                                 
1
  A research permit from the Tanzanian Commission for Sciences and Technology (COSTECH) and an ethical 
clearance from the Muhimbili University for Health and Allied Sciences (MUHAS), as well as consent from 
regional and district officers were obtained. The Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics provided the 
information required to revisit the women interviewed in 2004. The data collected in 2010 is authorized by 
MUHAS. Prior to the interview, regional officers of the NBS visited the enumeration areas to ask for 
permission and to track the women to be interviewed. The respondents were first informed by their local 
leaders and asked for consent. At the start of the interview, consent was asked again by the researchers.  
2
  It is realistic to assume that reproductive health may also have an impact on women’s contribution to the 
household income. Storeng et al. (2008), found in Burkina Faso that near-miss pregnancy complications put 
strain on intra-household relations. Women with near-miss complications often felt responsible for the 
depletion of income (due to high health costs) and were blamed for it. In response many women tried to 
minimise spending on their own needs and often tried to become self-sufficient by resuming income 
generating activities, domestic and agricultural work often before they felt physically ready for it. 
3
   It should be noted that feminist scholars would probably come to a similar hypothesis, but they would not 
attribute it to a common set of preferences among household members, but rather point to a lack of control 
over the earnings and the resilience of gender ideologies (for example Kabeer, 1997). 
4
  The assumption in the divorce-threat bargaining model that women keep the same income sources after 
divorce is also recognized by Lundberg and Pollak (1996: 146-147) who state: “If divorcing partners 
maintain ownership of income received separately within marriage, the demands emerging from marital 
bargaining will depend not on total family income but on the income received by the husband and income 
received by the wife”. 
5
  Although we analyse various types of household model, and power dynamics are likely to change if women 
increase their income share, we do not suggest policies to intervene with these dynamics as such.  
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6
  We acknowledge that working and earning an income are only two of the possible channels to establish 
empowerment.  
7
  This decision leads to a loss in precision. However, the number of observations in the middle categories are 
too low. We have run analyses with different categories, and concluded that the current distinction is the best 
reflection.   
8
  An alternative would have been to focus on sole decision making by the respondent. This correlates strongly 
with the indicator used in the analyses (.6671). Running the analyses with the alternative indicator does lead 
to minor differences in the results, but the main effect of economic empowerment remains intact. Results 
available upon request.  
9
  Cronbach’s alpha on these four items is .8593. The loading on the factor is between .6379 and .8518. 
10
  Cronbach’s alpha is .9200, with factor loadings between .7571 and .9302. 
11
  Although we have tried to limit omitted variable bias as much as possible, it remains a potential concern as 
long as earning an income is not randomized. One possible omitted attribute might be related to personality 
characteristics of the women.    
12
  Working away from home does not necessarily mean being formally employed. It also includes women who 
work on land located further away from the home. Among the 15 per cent who contributes to the household 
financially, the largest share (70 per cent) works in agriculture.  
13
  We expected that women who earn an income are also more likely to control household expenses as it is 
(partly) their money to be spent, hence this result is rather unexpected. It might be explained by the 
indicators of employment: women who are not working or working at home have the highest control over 
money. Most likely, they are in charge of daily businesses at home.  
14
  It is rather unexpected that women’s economic contribution is significantly correlated with decision making 
but not with control over household expenses, despite that some household decisions have financial 
implications (small and large household purchases). However, the decision making index is broader than 
pure financial decisions (including the decision what to buy). 
15
  Ordinary Least Square regression results are preferred over Poisson regression for interpretation purposes. 
Poisson regression leads to similar results.  
16
  Based on a White test we conclude that there is no indication of heteroskedasticity in the analyses based on 
the year of pregnancy. See the online Appendix for more details.  
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17
  Likelihood-ratio test suggests that there is no heteroskedasticity based on the year of pregnancy (details can 
be found in the online Appendix).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables (2010)     
Current contraceptive use 
.215 .411 0 1 
Number of ANC received 3.492 1.844 0 12 
Delivery at home 
.501 .500 0 1 
Delivery at dispensary or health centre 
.299 .458 0 1 
Delivery at hospital 
.200 .400 0 1 
 
    
Empowerment indicators (2004) 
    
Contribution to household income 
.146 .353 0 1 
Not working 
.025 .158 0 1 
Working at home 
.444 .497 0 1 
Working away from home 
.531 .499 0 1 
Domestic decision-making  
-.081 .908 -.845 1.362 
Control over money 
-.060 .947 -1.050 1.059 
 
    
Control variables (2004) 
    
Age 15.182 8.426 0 34 
No education   
.283 .451 0 1 
Incomplete primary 
.168 .374 0 1 
Complete primary or higher 
.544 .498 0 1 
Moslem 
.096 .295 0 1 
Catholic 
.450 .498 0 1 
Protestant 
.319 .466 0 1 
Not religious 
.135 .342 0 1 
Media exposure  
.650 .477 0 1 
Number of births  4.110 2.756 0 13 
Previous pregnancy loss 
.200 .400 0 1 
Husband does not live in same HH 
.106 .308 0 1 
No polygynous marriage 
.722 .448 0 1 
Polygynous marriage – ranked 1st wife 
.124 .330 0 1 
Polygynous marriage – ranked lower 
.154 .361 0 1 
Education husband (years) 5.653 3.039 0 18 
Wealth  
-.308 .664 -.851 3.773 
Infecund (in 2010) 
.267 .443 0 1 
Pregnant or amenorrheic (in 2010) 
.169 .375 0 1 
Road passable throughout the year 
.606 .489 0 1 
Availability public transport 
.571 .495 0 1 
Region: Kagera 
.355 .479 0 1 
Region: Mwanza 
.436 .496 0 1 
Region: Mara 
.209 .407 0 1 
Notes. Weights applied to adjust for the original two-stage sampling design; sample limited to women married in both 
2004 and 2010. 
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Table 2. The likelihood of current contraceptive use 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Contribution to household income  .130*** (.054) 
.184*** 
(.059) 
.014 
(.028) 
Not working ref ref ref ref 
Working at/close to home -.048 (.088) 
-.063 
(.086) 
-.068 
(.089) 
-.003 
(.060) 
Working away from home -.095 (.089) 
-.118 
(.090) 
-.114 
(.096) 
-.021 
(.063) 
Domestic decision-making   -.068*** (.020) 
-.035*** 
(.013) 
Control over household expenses   .005 (.017) 
.024** 
(.010) 
Control variables No No No Yes 
N 500 500 496 477 
Wald chi2 1.98 8.89 18.46 669.32 
Prob > chi2 .3715 .0307 .0024 .0000 
Pseudo R2 .0037 .0147 .0340 .3910 
Log pseudolikelihood -258.97 -256.12 -249.80 -149.35 
Notes. Probit regression (marginal probabilities reported) with robust standard errors (between brackets) to control for 
intra-village dependencies. Weights applied to adjust for the original two-stage sampling design. Model 3 controls for age, 
education, polygyny, presence of husband, religion, media exposure, number of births, previous pregnancy loss, wealth, 
fecundity, need for family planning (pregnancy and amenorrheic period), remoteness of the community, and region. Two-
sided p-values * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
Table 3. Determinants of the number of antenatal care visits 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Contribution to household income  .789*** (.227) 
.832*** 
(.263) 
.552** 
(.249) 
Not working ref ref ref ref 
Working at/close to home 1.058** (.454) 
.968** 
(.463) 
.923** 
(.453) 
1.236*** 
(.408) 
Working away from home .595 (.444) 
.465 
(.448) 
.422 
(.443) 
.750** 
(.350) 
Domestic decision-making   -.187 (.145) 
-.076 
(.148) 
Control over household expenses   -.035 (.090) 
.005 
(.111) 
Control variables No No No Yes 
Constant 2.706*** (.402) 
2.706*** 
(.403) 
2.700*** 
(.391) 
1.552** 
(.693) 
N 368 368 365 351 
F (Wald chi2) 3.35 7.48 4.19 2.65 
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Prob > F (Prob > chi2) .0430 .0003 .0029 .0021 
R-squared .0197 .0414 .0466 .1278 
Notes. OLS regression with robust standard errors (between brackets) to control for intra-village dependencies. Weights 
applied to adjust for the original two-stage sampling design. Model 3 controls for age, education, polygyny, presence of 
husband, religion, media exposure, number of births, previous pregnancy loss, wealth, remoteness of the community, and 
region. Two-sided p-values * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of the place of delivery 
 
Delivery at health facility versus home 
delivery Delivery at hospital 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Contribution to 
household income  
.349*** 
(.058) 
.373*** 
(.062) 
.310*** 
(.076)  
.225*** 
(.074) 
.281*** 
(.078) 
.141** 
(.077) 
Not working ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Working at/close to 
home 
-.290 
(.192) 
-.328 
(.188) 
-.313 
(.189) 
-.058 
(.145) 
-.147 
(.104) 
-.171 
(.101) 
-.159 
(.100) 
.035 
(.070) 
Working away from 
home 
-.243 
(.182) 
-.296 
(.179) 
-.266 
(.184) 
-.031 
(.145) 
-.064 
(.099) 
-.100 
(.103) 
-.064 
(.104) 
.116* 
(.075) 
Domestic decision-
making   
-.053 
(.035) 
-.044 
(.039)   
-.051* 
(.027) 
-.073*** 
(.026) 
Control over household 
expenses   
.063** 
(.031) 
.075** 
(.036)   
.060** 
(.030) 
.032 
(.022) 
Control variables No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 369 369 366 352 369 369 366 352 
Wald chi2 2.13 28.20 30.36 121.99 3.14 18.33 25.02 222.72 
Prob > chi2 .3451 .0000 .0000 .0000 .2075 .0004 .0001 .0000 
Pseudo R2 .0062 .0504 .0643 .1932 .0134 .0462 .0817 .2385 
Log pseudolikelihood -254.19 -242.87 -237.35 -196.75 -181.98 -175.94 -168.08 -129.40 
Notes. Probit regression (marginal probabilities reported) with robust standard errors (between brackets) to control for intra-
village dependencies. Weights applied to adjust for the original two-stage sampling design. Model 3 controls for age, 
education, polygyny, presence of husband, religion, media exposure, number of births, previous pregnancy loss, wealth, 
remoteness of the community, and region. Two-sided p-values * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
Table 5. Heckman models versus inverse probability weights 
 Contraceptive use ANC Delivery at health facility Delivery at hospital 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Contribution to household 
income 
.112 
(.207) 
.003 
(.018) 
.543** 
(.253) 
.668*** 
(.234) 
.759*** 
(.233) 
.414*** 
(.060) 
.354 
(.224) 
.115** 
(.070) 
Not working ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Working at/close to home -.086 (.579) 
-.048** 
(.025) 
2.440*** 
(.657) 
1.493** 
(.671) 
-.446 
(.401) 
.082 
(.205) 
-.746** 
(.372) 
.048 
(.062) 
Working away from home -.217 (.582) 
-.078*** 
(.036) 
1.966*** 
(.612) 
.824 
(.592) 
-.416 
(.419) 
-.013 
(.208) 
-.485 
(.412) 
.114* 
(.069) 
Domestic decision-making -.279*** (.087) 
-.031*** 
(.012) 
-.214 
(.169) 
.064 
(.176) 
-.062 
(.107) 
-.034 
(.050) 
-.121 
(.142) 
-.055** 
(.022) 
Control over household 
expenses 
.192** 
(.087) 
.016 
(.008) 
-.055 
(.107) 
.004 
(.134) 
.192** 
(.082) 
.082** 
(.040) 
.141* 
(.084) 
.015 
(.017) 
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N 1107 477 1110 351 1111 352 1111 352 
Wald chi2 735.98 759.39 55.92 8.67 142.01 129.15 180.03 138.43 
Prob > chi2 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Log pseudolikelihood -1200.97 -121.61 -1885.10 - -1162.14 -181.24 -1059.63 -104.05 
Rho -.019 (.434) - 
.726 
(.174) - 
-.428 
(.304) - 
-.902 
(.167) - 
Wald test rho. Prob>chi2 .9644 - .0123 - .2193 - .0978 - 
Notes. Models 1 report results from Heckman analyses. Models 2 apply inverse probability weights. All control variables included. 
Two-sided p-values * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
